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ABSTRACT
The effect of social capital on economic growth is examined using linear regression anal-
ysis and U.S. county-level data. Results reveal that social capital has a statistically signif-
icant, independent positive effect on the rate of per-capita income growth.
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The growing literature on social capital has
added a new dimension to studies of economic
growth, as mainstream economists start to an-
alyze the roles of culture and social ties as
factors of production similar to physical and
human capital. In particular, economists in-
creasingly recognize that interactions among
people and their feelings for each other have
clear and predictable economic implications
(Robison).
Despite this growing recognition, the effect
of social capital on economic growth at the
level of U.S. counties has not been formally
and systematically analyzed. In this paper the
conventional Barro-type empirical growth
model is expanded to test for the independent
effects of social capital or civic engagement
on economic growth. Our results suggest that
the level of social capital had a statistically
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significant, independent positive effect on the
rate of per-capita income growth in U.S. coun-
ties between 1990 and 1996. At the same time,
excluding the social capital vector does not
materially change the estimate of the conver-
gence parameter or the effect of human capital
on growth.
Literature and Conceptual Background
Social capital in its present form was first
identified by Jane Jacobs, Pierre Bourdieu and
Jean-Claude Passeron, and Glenn Loury, but
has since been developed most extensively by
James Coleman and Robert Putnam. 1Interest
in the concept of social capitrd was renewed
with the publication of Putnam’s Making De-
mocracy Work.
Putnam uses the term social capital to refer
to features of social organization, such as net-
works, norms and tmst, which facilitate co-
ordination and cooperation for mutual gain.
Coleman defines social capital as “a variety
of different entities, with two elements in
common: they all consist of some aspect of
social structure, and they facilitate certain ac-
tions of actors—whether personal or corporate
1See Woolcock on the history of the definition of
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actors—within the structure” (p. 598). Wool-
cock describes social capital as “. . . a broad
term encompassing the norms and networks
facilitating collective action for mutual bene-
fit.” In general, social capital includes the in-
stitutions, the relationships, the attitudes, val-
ues and beliefs that govern interactions among
people and contribute to economic and social
development (World Bank).z
Robison, Schmid and Siles address the
question of whether social capital has features
(such as durability, decay and service poten-
tial) that are similar to features of physical
capital. They also present results of a survey
administered at a conference on social capital
that yielded rankings of various definitions of
social capital. No single definition of social
capital was universally agreed to by confer-
ence participants.
Putnam’s primary focus is on civic engage-
ment—participation in voluntary associations,
along with activities such as voting. He argues
that civic engagement builds social capital by
fostering personal interaction. Repeated inter-
action in turn facilitates communication and
amplifies information about the trustworthi-
ness and cooperation of others, which reduces
transaction costs associated with economic ex-
change. Robison and Schmid suggest that the
main cause of economic and social failures is
lack of social capital, in other words a lack of
caring, goodwill, loyalty, sense of belonging,
sense of community, or social closeness. Fu-
kuyama claims that the presence or absence of
social capital or “trust” in a society is a key
determinant of economic success. Tivo recent
surveys in the Journal of Economic Literature
emphasize the importance of social capital in
the economic performance of a country or re-
gion (Temple; Collier and Gunning).
A major economic effect of social capital
is that it reduces information and transaction
costs. When transaction costs and the costs of
gathering and disseminating information are
reduced, less risk is involved and more ex-
change takes place, thus enlarging the scope
2WorldBankSocialCapitalweb-sitecontainsoth-
er key referencesto social capital.URL: http://www.
worldbank.orglpovertylscapitall
of transactions and interactions. Conversely, a
lack of social capital results in demands for
more external controls, such as tougher law
enforcement and security systems, monitoring
and enforcement (Flora and Flora). Schmid
and Robison explore how social capital be-
come a part of capital inputs in a production
process. They describe how interpersonal trust
can be a substitute for physical inputs of po-
lice surveillance and legal service (p. 59).
Another contribution of social capital is
that it affects the supply of certain public
goods. The provision of public goods is sub-
ject to free riding or shirking if most users do
not participate in joint actions to make the pro-
vision of public good a success. In these sit-
uations conventional theories of collective ac-
tion have concluded that individuals will
resort to strategic behavior by refusing to con-
tribute toward the public good in order to ob-
tain a benefit far greater than the cost they
have to pay. When social capital is present,
externalities are internalized, which has the ef-
fect of eliminating or reducing the free rider
problem and the misuse of public goods while
at the same time increasing investments in
public goods.
Social capital also has several negative as-
pects. While “good” social capital may facil-
itate collective action and promote economic
development, “bad” social capital can stifle
cooperation and economic development.
Good-old-boy (girl) clubs and gangs are ex-
amples of bad social capital. Levi suggests
that it may have been better for individuals to
bowl alone in certain cases (for example, Tim-
othy McVeigh and other co-conspirators in the
Oklahoma City bombing were members of a
bowling league). Strong ties within groups can
lead to the exclusion of others, who are there-
fore unable to benefit from group membership.
For example some ethnic groups dominate
certain occupations and industries and mer-
chants in some countries refuse to deal with
traders of a different ethnic background, and
newcomers are often excluded from strongly
tied industrial groups (Portes and Landolt).
Olson argued that some groups deliberately
suppress economic growth by securing a dis-
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hibiting individual economic advancement by
placing heavy personal obligations on mem-
bers, which prevents them from participating
in broader social networks. He points out that
in societies that permit free trade and free or-
ganization, coalitions will form around mar-
ketable goods and services. These coalitions
may engage in rent-seeking activities, some-
time at the expense of society in general. For
example, producer co-operatives form to pro-
tect members’ assets and, if possible, to boost
profits by raising prices. Labor unions orga-
nize to bargain for wages. Doctors and law-
yers join professional organizations to protect
their own interests.
Only a small number of empirical studies
directly relate social capital variables to eco-
nomic growth. Robison and Siles empirically
tested the relationship between changes in so-
cial capital indicator variables and the level
and disparity of household income in the Unit-
ed States and found that changes in social cap-
ital have a significant effect on the disparity
and level of household income. Temple and
Johnson found that various social capital in-
dices perform well in predicting economic
growth across countries. Using social capital
indicators from the World Values Survey,
Knack and Keefer determined that trust and
civic norms are stronger in nations with higher
and more equal incomes. They also found that
membership in formal organizations—Put-
nam’s measure of social capital—is not asso-
ciated with improved economic performance.
Narayan and Pritchett found that for a sample
of Tanzanian villages membership levels in
various associations were positively correlated
with per-capita income. Helliwell and Putnam
found significant evidence that per-capita GDP
convergence is faster, and equilibrium levels
of income are higher, in regions with higher
levels of social capital. They used data from
northern and southern Italy and three measures
of social capital (the extent of civic commu-
nity, institutional performance, and citizen sat-
isfaction) to test their hypotheses.
In this paper we estimate a Barre-type
growth model to analyze the effects of social
capital or civic engagement on economic
growth in the U.S. at the county level. The
impact of social capital on expanding econom-
ic activity has not been empirically substanti-
ated at the county level. One advantage of us-
ing county-level data is that they contain fewer
structural differences than cross-country data,
which is a criticism raised by Miller. In addi-
tion, certain measures are available which
would be difficult to collect across different
countries, and the US data tend to be collected
in a consistent manner. Related recent studies
of income convergence at the country level
include Levine and Renelt, Grammy and As-
sane, Murthy and Chien, and Greasley and
Oxley, who use time series data from selected
OECD countries. Goetz and Hu also estimate
a county-level economic growth model, but do
not include social capital variables among the
regressors.
We test the general hypothesis that social
capital, while not overriding the effects of
conventional measures of growth, has additive
effects on economic growth. We examine the
impact of the density of various types of as-
sociations, economic agents’ financial support
for charitable organizations and participation
in elections, as well as crime rates—as mea-
sures of social capital—on the rate of econom-
ic growth. We realize that endogeneity is a po-
tential concern but we have dealt with it as
best as we could (given the availability of data
only in certain years) by including starting
conditions at a point in time that precedes the
growth period.
Specification
To determine the impact of social capital on
income growth we specify an economic
growth model using change in county-level
per-capita personal income across the U.S. as
the dependent variable. In previous studies,
per-capita income (output) growth has been
modeled as a function of initial per-capita in-
come, initial human capital stock, and a set of
control and related variables. An extended ver-
sion of a general economic growth model can
be written as in Barro and Sala-I-Martin, p.
421:
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where Dy< is per-capita income growth, Y,.l
initial per-capita income, H,-, initial human
capital stock, SC,-, initial social capital stock,
and R,-, a set of control variables. The empir-
ical specification of the growth model closely
follows that in Goetz and Hu (p. 356), with
the addition of our measures of social capital
stocks:
(2) Dy, = aO + Q, Y,., + cqH,.T + @SC,-T
+ ~R,_T + U,,
where Dy, = (Y, – Yt.,)/Y,.,, Y~and y~-, are
personal income per capita in 1990 and 1996,
~ = 6, a, @ and r are parameters to be esti-
mated, and u is a random disturbance. Edu-
cational attainment serves as a proxy for hu-
man capital stocks, as in Goetz and Hu: H,.,
is the percent of population 25 years or older
in 1990 with a bachelor’s, graduate, or a pro-
fessional degree.
A major obstacle often cited in studies of
social capital is the empirical measurement of
the variables in vector SC,-,. We use County
Business Patterns and USA Counties data
from the Commerce Department to construct
indicators of associational activity, a crime in-
dex, and a voter participation rate, and data
from the National Center for Charitable Sta-
tistics (NCCS) to measure county-level public
support for charitable organizations.
Associational Activity
The measure of principal interest is the num-
ber of the following establishments in each
county: (a) bowling centers, (b) public golf
courses, (c) membership sports and recreation
clubs, (d) civic and social associations, (e) re-
ligious organizations, (~) labor organizations,
(g) business associations, (h) professional or-
ganizations, (i) political organizations. Our
measure of the density of associational activity
(All Groups) in counties is the total number of
establishments per 10,000 persons in 1990.
We also test the possibility indicated in Knack
and Keefer, that rent-seeking organizations
have a negative effect on economic perfor-
mance, by dividing the above organizations
into “Olsonian” and “Putnam-esque” groups.
Groups (a) through (e) are “Puntam-esque”
(P-Groups) or those groups that are unlikely
to be rent-seeking, but which involve social
interaction that can promote trust and coop-
eration. Groups ~) through (i) are considered
to be rent-seeking organizations in the sense
of Olson (0-Groups).
“Perverse” Social Capital (or Negative
Social Capital)
Criminal activity has been interpreted as a
symptom of deteriorating social capital or lack
of social capital (e.g., Rubio). Low crime rates
in a county may indicate a more cohesive
community. The modified crime index (crime
index and arson) for 1990 from the USA
County data set is used to measure “perverse”
social capital (Crime).
Charitable Giving and Voting
These two variables complete the vector of so-
cial capital indicators (Knack). County-level
public support data for charitable organiza-
tions (Charity) are obtained from the National
Center for Charitable Statistics (NCSS). The
NCCS Core files are based on the IRS’s An-
nual Return transaction files. The Charity var-
iable had 230 missing values which were re-
placed by the sample mean value for the
analysis. Variable voting is the percent of eli-
gible voters participating in the federal elec-
tion, averaged over 1988 and 1992 (county-
level data on participation in local elections
are not available on the CD-Rem).
On the basis of Goetz and Hu’s study, the
following variables are included in vector R as
controls and related influences. Urban denotes
metropolitan counties and Rural is counties
having places with no more than 2,500 resi-
dents. These capture the effects of population
agglomeration in a county on growth; non-ur-
ban/non-rural counties are the excluded cate-
gory. Highway indicates whether (=1) or not
(=0) the county has an interstate highway ac-
cess ramp, to measure basic physical infra-
structure and the degree of isolation of a coun-
ty. Public highway spending (Hiwyexp)Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater: Social Capital and Economic Growth 569
proxies for public investment. Variable Corp-
tax is the percent of state taxes that are col-
lected from corporations. A higher value is hy-
pothesized to discourage new firm locations
and, therefore, to depress economic growth. A
state-level right-to-work law indicator variable
(O, 1) is included to measure the strength of
labor, independently of item (~) (Labor orga-
nizations) above. Seven other indicator vari-
ables are included to capture regional effects:
New England, Mideast, Plains, Southeast,
Southwest, Rocky Mountain, and Far West
(the East/North central region or Great Lakes
region is the excluded category).
Empirical Results
Table 1 reports ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates of equation (2), using data from
3,040 U.S. counties, corrected for heteroske-
dasticity.3 The growth period covers 1990
through 1996. In Model 1 all social capital
indicators are excluded. According to Model
2, the association activity variable, All Groups,
exerts a statistically significant, positive effect
on economic growth. This indicates that as-
sociation activity influenced county-level eco-
nomic performance in the 1990s to a signifi-
cant degree and independently of the other
factors affecting economic growth. As hypoth-
esized, Crime is negative and significant, in-
dicating that a high crime rate in a county has
a negative impact on its economic growth. The
effect of charitable giving on growth, on the
other hand, is positive but not statistically dif-
ferent from zero. Voting exhibits a non-linear
effect, leading first to an increase and then a
decrease in income growth. The maximum
value of this quadratic function is reached at
a voter participation rate of 50.5 percent. This
result therefore confirms that participation in
elections affects economic growth, but the ef-
fect is subject to diminishing returns. Param-
eter estimates for all of the other regressors
are statistically different from zero and, with
the exception of corporate taxes and the right-
3The Breusch–Paganchi-squaredstatisticshows
thatheteroskedasticity is presentin thedataset.
to-work law variable, each has the expected
sign.
A comparison of Models 1 and 2 shows
that the coefficient estimates on starting in-
come (al) and human capital (a2) do not differ
materially, so that the specification bias asso-
ciated with excluding social capital variables
in this regression model and this particular
data set is relatively small. Even so, a Wald
test of the hypothesis that the coefficients of
all the social capital variables (All Groups,
Crime, Charity, and Voting) are jointly zero is
rejected at the 1-percent level, indicating that
this vector needs to be included in the regres-
sion.
We next test for the possibly negative ef-
fects on economic growth of rent-seeking or-
ganizations (P-Groups) and positive effects of
organizations that promote trust and coopera-
tion (O-Groups). The results in Model 3 in-
dicate that both types of organizations have
positive and statistically significant effects on
economic growth in US counties. Thus we
find no support for Olson’s argument that or-
ganizations with redistributive goals encour-
age anti-growth rent-seeking. In contrast, rent-
seeking organizations in this data set have a
positive and significant effect on economic
growth. These results do not change when we
include only labor organizations in P-Groups,
or delete religious organizations from the O-
Groups.
The positive effect of social capital on eco-
nomic growth may be more pronounced in
poorer counties, if social capital is more pro-
ductive in situations where local cooperation
substitutes for the direct provision of services
by government or profit-seeking firms. To test
this hypothesis—and explore potential inter-
actions between social capital and initial in-
come levels—we estimated auxiliary regres-
sions with selected interaction terms. Only
results for the interacted variables and inter-
action terms are reported here.
If the above hypothesis is valid, the inter-
action terms for “good” social capital vari-
ables (All Groups and Voting) with initial in-
come will be negative, suggesting that
decreases in income enhance the positive ef-
fects of these social capital variables on eco-Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 2000
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nomic growth, while the interaction term be-
tween “bad” social capital (Critne) and initial
income will be positive (and significant). In
this case, a decline in income increases the
negative effect of the “bad” social capital on
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where t-statistics are in parentheses. The in-
teraction term All Groups*Y,-T is positive but
not statistically significant. The negative and
significant coefficient on Voting* Yt_7 and the
positive and significant coefficient on
Crime* Y,-, tend to provide support for our hy-
pothesis.
Conclusion
The results presented here suggest that social
capital or civic engagement is an important in-
dependent determinant of economic growth in
U.S. counties. We find significant evidence
that per-capita income grows more rapidly in
counties with high levels of social capital,
measured using the density of membership or-
ganizations, crime rate, charitable giving and
voter participation. These results also suggest
that future studies of economic growth should
incorporate measures of social capital to avoid
specification bias, although this type of bias
may be relatively small.
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